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DEMOCRACY, EFFICIENCY, STABILITY. By Arthur C. Millspaugh. Washing-
ton: The Brookings Institution, 1942. Pp. 522. $4.00.
THERE are times when not only political institutions and processes them-
selves have to be reinterpreted, but the very criteria and basic assumptions
upon which the interpretation is based must be submitted to fresh examina-
tion. Now is certainly one of these times, and it is to the credit of Mr. Mills-
paugh that he has recognized it. His book sets up a more meaningful scheme
of analysis than most of the standard texts on American government. If it
does not quite measure up in execution to conception it is because the latter
is too ambitious. The author ranges so widely in the fields of history, politi-
cal science, economics and sociology that his terms of reference sometimes be-
come blurred and his work loses direction and synthesis. His style is often
abstract to the point of obscurity and some of his judgments so cautious as
to seem evasive-faults which should, perhaps, be more appropriately charged
against his institutional sponsors than against the author himself. Neverthe-
less, he has brought together in one volume the dynamic political trends of
our times and measured them by standards of genuine significance to the
United States of 1942.
The book opens with a brief introduction in which Mr. Millspaugh estab-
lishes his criteria for democracy, efficiency and stability. This is followed by
two major sections of some two hundred pages each, in which the outstand-
ing trends and institutions of American political life are tested against these
criteria. The author then returns in a conclusion to his original definitions,
sums up the evidence, and renders his verdict. As his title suggests, he is
at pains to show whether efficiency and stability, the two primary essentials
of modern government, may be achieved in a democracy, or, for that matter,
whether democracy itself is any longer attainable. Democracy means a form
of society in which "the people, if they are not actually the government, are
at least a fundamental organ of government." Efficiency, an "intangible
quality . . . ultimately measured by net results" means the ability to bring
about "economic progress and national security." Stability "implies predicta-
bility. It means, not changelessness, but peaceful. orderly change."
In Part I, entitled "Evolution and Experience", these qualities are sought
in the principal trends of American government from the framing of the Con-
stitution to the Hoover Administration. Here the political and economic his-
tory of the United States is severely abstracted and compressed into five chap-
ters roughly chronological in design. In the opinion of the reviewer, this is
the weakest part of the book. It is too condensed for a lay reader and not
condensed enough for an informed one. It adds little, either in facts or
ideas, to the composite of innumerable existing historical and economic texts.
Much, if not all, of it could have been assumed, or stated as "given" without
damaging the author's attempt at a truly thorough, "scientific" analysis.
Part II, "The Latest Time of Test", is far more successful, and forms,
with the conclusion, the real substance of the book. In this the political life
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of the American people during the New Deal decade is broken down into
particulars and reviewed in eight chapters, entitled, respectively: Depression
Policies, Social and Economic; Bureaucracy and Public Power; Centraliza-
tion; Congressional Weakness and Presidential Domination; "Making De-
mocracy Work"; Managed Opinion: The Constitution and Stability; Govern-
ment and World Crisis. Here the truly functional problems of a modern
democracy are presented and studied, in a manner happily uninhibited by
institutional forms or stereotypes of national policy. Whether for its syn-
thesis or for its itemized criticism of detail, this part is to be commended
to any serious student of American government and political economy.
If there is any central theme to Part II, or indeed to the whole book, it is
the steady rise of executive leadership in the United States, with its corollary,
the steady delegation of authority and responsibility by the people to those
who govern them. The implications of this trend for a system and an ideal
of government supposedly based on the concept of popular sovereignty are
clear. Mr. Millspaugh writes a scholarly epitaph for the day of legislative
supremacy, at the same time pointing out the shortcomings of the adminis-
trative process which has superseded it. He reveals, with cogent suggestions
for the future, the enormous powers of the economic pressure groups that
have assumed the sovereignty of the people and wield it more effectively
than the parties. The comprehensive expansion and extension of state initia-
tive into every phase of American life, evidence for which fills his pages,
finally leads Mr. Millspaugh to the conclusion that the United States has
moved far from democracy in its classical meaning and into an era in which
democracy can be realized in spirit only by fundamental political readjust-
ment. As for efficiency and stability, these, too, hover in the balance. The
most he can offer for them is a hung jury over in the Brookings Institution.
A. WHITNEY GRISWOLD -
THE STRENGTH OF NATIONS. By George Soule. New York: The Macmillan
Company, 1942. Pp. 263. $2.50.
IN his latest book Mr. Soule calls for honest inquiry into the social ills of
our day. He challenges the now muddling social sciences to re-examine so-
called facts and old theories, to pose new and pertinent questions. He im-
plores these quasi-disciplines to proceed "scientifically", to discover new meth-
odologies and techniques. In time, it is hoped, such relatively objective re-
evaluation will produce workable hypotheses and basic laws. In turn, these
newer formulations are to offer direction for action which will help solve
the problems of human society.
We can accept without contention Mr. Soule's list of major social ills:
unemployment, uneven distribution of income, needless waste of natural re-
sources, widespread existence of physical and mental illness, high preva-
lence of crime, numerous political difficulties, "the conflicting sets of notions
t Assistant Professor of Government and International Relations, Yale University.
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and ways of political behavior that lead not only to war but to civil repres-
sion and misery." (p. 7). We accept less readily, however, his interestingly
stated, if not entirely original, suggestions for the solutions of these ills.
The seemingly broad discussion of the nature and present status of the
sciences (particularly physics, physiology, psychology and psychiatry) needs
little comment here. With due acknowledgment, the author borrows from
R. H. Shryock and Leslie A. White to develop a rational basis for the main
theme of his book.
Mr. Shryock has conveniently summarized four developmental stages in
science. "The first stage reveals a minimum of observation and a maximum
of theoretical synthesis; the second, an early attempt at objectivity and meas-
urement, characterized by pioneer enthusiasms; the third reveals a partial
reversion to speculative synthesis (with its inevitable 'schools' and contro-
versies) and a partial lapse of quantitative procedures due to difficulties in
carrying out the quantatitive program; the fourth level witnesses a revival
of the quantitative procedure, this time upon a firmer factual basis and with
a technique so improved as to make possible a final victory f6r modern meth-
odology." (p. 33).
Mr. White offered a useful classification of the sciences. Mr. Soule re-
phrases it thus: "There is first, the inorganic, which includes only those phe-
nomena which we call inanimate or lifeless. Next there is the organic, which
includes living organisms. Finally there is the super-organic, which deals with
the relationships among organisms. Mr. White calls this third realm 'cultural'
and says it pertains solely to human society, since man alone possesses a cul-
ture." (p. 44). Mr. Soule believes that he can contribute to the fourth
stage in this scientific progression and that he can enhance the understanding
of the super-organic structures through application of Freudian theories.
In the past the super-organic structure, which Mr. Soule narrows down
chiefly to socio-economic considerations, was studied primarily through ap-
proaches pertinent to the inorganic. These attempts have given incomplete
and ineffective results, particularly with reference to basic laws and work-
able hypotheses which have not been forthcoming. The author offers many
illustrations along these lines in his nicely condensed review of the various
"economic systems". He believes that the effective study of the super-organic
is through the organic, rather than through the inorganic. Since the dynamic
(Freudian) approach has been so valuable in analyzing and directing the
organic (individual), it is assumed that similar procedures directed toward
the super-organic will bring forth the theoretical and functional desiderata.
The book unfortunately does not reveal why it may be assumed that in-
quiries into the super-organic are on the verge of entering into the fourth
stage of the cited scientific progression. The methods and techniques whereby
this dynamic approach is to operate are not given in any detail.
It is, perhaps, not insignificant that we find in juxtaposition Mr. Soule's
succinct summaries of Freudian and economic theories. (Incidentally, the
summary of Freudian theory is both accurate and concise.) In the author's
sample analysis of two new social orders, fascism and communism, this same
juxtaposition of psychological theory and socio-economic patterning remains.
One fails to perceive here that the application of Freudian theory has ren-
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dered more comprehensible the organization and functioning of these two
societies.
Although in an occasional sentence Mr. Soule admits the possibility that
the super-organic may be something more than a simple multiplication of
the needs and expressions of organic units, nevertheless lie proceeds as if
the latter were true. The aim of making the individual function effectively
"by the development of a conscious rational ego, an organized persunality
competent to deal with reality", is suddenly translated into a group goal.
There is a tacit assumption that the resultants of multiple and complex hu-
man intra- and inter-personal relationships can be scrutinized by the same
principles which apply to the individual. But may not the aggregation cif
individual needs, desires and gratifications through their quantitative expres-
sion obtain qualitative changes? And if different qualities ensue, may not
these in turn have inherent patterns and be directed by forces different from
those which we now associate with the individual?
In the analysis of an individual, his behavior, his conscious thoughts
and unconscious material brought to a conscious level are constantly
pitted against the "realities" of the individual's life-situations. These "reali-
ties" are essentially the super-organic structure of our discussion. An in-
dividual is mature, well-adjusted and "free" only when he can cope with
this super-organic structure, driven and motivated least by anxieties and ir-
rational thinking and most by his own rational values, judgments and choices.
Such an individual can act with his energies well-channeled and not dissipated
by neurotic behavior. Such an individual is "free" only to the extent that he
has come to terms with the culture in which lie lives, neither being over-
whelmed by its demands nor radically opposing it to a point of ostracism
from the group.
Against what "reality values" is Mr. Soule going to pit the analyzed ab-
stractions of super-organic expressions? Even if aspects of the super-organic
can be described along analytical lines, what is Mr. Soule going to motivate
in the super-organic toward different expression and action that will seek
goals in social welfare, freedom and total peace? Examples of such a "dynam-
ic approach", including those given in Mr. Soule's book, reveal as yet too
little real analysis and too much squeezing of observable facts into precon-
ceived theoretical patterns.
We share with Ir. Soule the desire for social change: we share also his
sincere interest in and admiration for Freudian theory; but we do not share
his belief that the dynamic approach, unmodified and merely transformed from
individual to social-economic realms, will offer the "scientific" basis for the
solution of our social problems.
HELEN G. RIcHTER -
t Assistant Professor, Yale University School of Medicine.
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FEDERAL COOPERATION WITH THE STATES UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE.
By Joseph E. Kallenbach. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press,
1942. Pp. 428. $4.00.
IN administering the commerce clause of the Constitution, the Supreme
Court has had a highly practical job on its hands. The familiar story begins
with the joint premises that the Court is the keeper of the Constitution and
that the commerce clause needs no Congressional action to bring it into play
against state enactments. It continues with the peculiarities of a system of
Constitutional litigation which, emphasizing the role of the individual against
the State or the Nation as the case may be, have come dangerously close at
times to making commercial freedom a right of the individual akin to the
freedoms of the Bill of Rights. And it involves, for its first hundred years
or so, a Congress that had little inclination to exercise the power which was
given it by the clause-almost as little interest, in fact, as it has taken in
its power under the last paragraph of the Fourteenth Amendment.
A hundred years of litigation yielded many attempts by the Court to for-
mulate criteria for determining when state statutes should be held inoperative.
The need-of-uniform-regulation test was one.of these criteria.' The original
package doctrine was another.2 The direct-or-indirect-effect question posed
still another. Often these formulae spoke in terms of the unchallengeable.
But always they were exercises in practical reason. Their variety shouted of
the tentativeness of the judicial rule. Put side by side, they raised the quacre
whether no other body than the Court was competent to exercise the same
sort of reason.
The Court itself began to suggest that laying down such tests as these was
not something to which it alone was competent. Quietly, in Welton v. Mis-
souri3 and in Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District,4 the now familiar
phrase "in the absence of Congressional action" or its equivalent began to
put in an appearance. The phrase was not a sign that the Court had resigned
its power; it was an admission that Congress, too, could exercise the same
power. And the admission came to full fruit in Clark Distilling Company v.
Western Maryland Railway Company5 when, in the midst of his customary
obscurities, Chief justice White suddenly reminded his hearers that it was a
"mistaken assumption that'the accidental considerations which cause a sub-
ject on the one hand to come under state control in the absence of congres-
sional regulation, and other subjects on the contrary to be free from state
control until Congress has acted, are the essential criteria by which to test
the question of the power of Congress to regulate and the mode in which
the exertion of that power may be manifested."
1. Realistically,, the-ormula might better have been phrased in terms of uniformity
of non-regulationr ... .. . .....
2. Some irreverent person, tracing the development of the doctrine, has suggested
that, having been born of the virgin Marshall and having suffered under Pontius Pilate
Taney, it was raised the third day by Chief Justice Fuller and, at a considerably later
time, ascended into heaven under the guidance of Mr. Justice Cardozo.
3. 91 U. S. 275 (1875).
4. 120 U. S. 489 (1887).
5. 242 U. S. 311, 330 (1917).
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Though Mr. Kallenbach does not give this pronouncement the emphasis
that it deserves in his story,0 it is to the elaboration of its background and
to the developments that have followed from it that, with much learning and
a wealth of detail, his story is devoted. Unlike Jane Perry Clark's book of a
not dissimilar title published a few years ago. it is not an attempt to give a
full account of the devices which the states and the federal government have
used to achieve concerted action.- Rather it confines itself to Constitutional
problems and sticks very close to the doctrinal discussions that have taken
place in Congress and the Court. In doing so, it covers not only the familiar
territory of Federal liquor legislation and the Twenty-First Amendment, but
also their counterparts in the oleomargarine, prison-made goods, stolen auto-
mobile, contraband oil and other less important fields. It deals not only with
federal legislation that, 'ia divestment or prohibition, goes to the protection
of receiving states but as well with that that has to do with protection of the
state of origin and with that which, instead of laying down a new Congres-
sional rule of interstate commerce, adopts state legislation as Congress' own.
The result is an exceedingly full, and occasionally repetitious, rehearsal
of pros and cons of the sort with which Constitutional debate has abounded.
The rehearsal is so full in fact that it is unlikely that it will have to be re-
peated again for a long, long time. It is because it is so satisfactory in this
way that one regrets that it is marred by minor misstatements2 by bits of
naivete,' 0 by occasional dogmatic statements where guesses would be more
in order," and by a too frequent willingness to carry water on both shoul-
6. Mr. Kallenbach apparently finds it extremely difficult to swallow such doctrine
or even to believe that Chief Justice White meant it. Compare p. 2-2: "Though the
result of the ruling in the Clark Distilling Company case was a desirable one, it is diffi-
cult to accept the reasoning of the Court without an acknowledgment that Congrers
possesses power to overrule the Court on the question of the limits to be ascribed state
authority in relation to interstate commerce."
7. Tmr RISE OF A NEW FEDERm-Lism: FuERAL-STATE CoOPM-TIO:; 1:' Tn UN;IrZo
STATEs (1938).
S. Neither does 'Mr. Kallenbach pay attention to the possible use by Congress of
its commerce power to remove State interference with commerce---e.q., in the interstate
barriers field.
9. For example, the apparent ascription of Willson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co.,
2 Pet. 244 (U. S. 1829), to "a strongly pro-states'-rights Court." (p. 33ff.).
10. For example, speaking of a suggestion that Chief Justice White's reference, in
the Clark Distilling Company case, to "the exceptional nature of the subject regulated"
might mean "that Congress could not permit state regulation of commerce in gocds in-
nocuous in themselves", the author adds that the Court's sustaining of the prison-made
goods acts in 1936 and 1937 "would seem to have settled the point that the Court could
not have meant" this. (p. 232).
11. -For- example, "No rulings illustrate more clearly than these involving commerce
in liquor and game the uncertainty of the result in judicial determination of the limits
of state authority to restrain interstate and foreign commerce. W \hat the Court actually
did in the two instances was to measure national and state interests against each other.
With reference to intoxicating liquors national commercial interests were of sufficient
importance in the judgment of the Court to warrant imposition of a check upon state
action, subject to possible reversal by Congress. With reference to game national com-
mercial interests were not sufficiently involved to impel the Court to take this action."
(p. 124).
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ders. 12 Most of all, one regrets Mr. Kallenbach's apparent incapacity or un-
willingness to assess the merits and demerits of the new way of freedom for
the states in terms other than doctrinal-an incapacity or unwillingness which
makes it look as though the law can properly be a judge in its own cause,
T. RICHARD WITMER f
THE JOURNAL OF SIR SIMONDS D'EwEs. Edited by Willson Havelock Coates.
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942. Pp. xliv, 459. $6.00.
BIT by bit the full story of the Parliaments of the early Stuarts is becoming
available to scholars. The publication of the story began over three hundred
years ago in the Diurnall Occurances and Passages in Parliament, inaccur-
rately printed narratives of the doings of the Long Parliament by shabby con-
temporary journalists. It went on in the seventeenth century and in the
eighteenth with the work of Clarendon, Nalson, and Rushworth, and the
printing of the official journals of the Houses; and it was resumed in the
nineteenth century when Carlyle's Cromwell revived interest in the first Stu-
arts. In the 1870's S. R. Gardiner, as a by-product of his monumental His-
tory of England 1603-1642, published a number of Parliamentary diaries of
Lords and Commoners of the days of James I and Charles I.
The magnitude of Gardiner's work frightened the English away from the
field; it was only after the lapse of a half century and on our side of the
Atlantic that scholars began anew the task of publishing the narrative of the
Parliaments of the early Stuarts. In 1921, Wallace Notestein's and Frances
Relf's Commons Debates for 1629 inaugurated the great tradition in the edit-
ing of the diaries of members of the Stuart Parliaments. The tradition is
12. Compare his criticism of the Court's reliance on the Webb-Kenyon Act in the
Clark Distilling Company case with his comments on its action in Silz v. Hesterberg,
211 U. S. 31 (1908). On the first the author writes: "The Court failed to seize the
opportunity to reverse its error in the earlier liquor cases by holding that commerce in
liquors was a subject upon which state measures enacted under the reserved powers of
the states might operate without express federal sanction . . . [Had it done so] long-
established constitutional doctrines would not have been seriously affected . . . The
Court would thus have avoided the task of elaborating a novel theory concerning Con-
gressional power to subject interstate commerce to state control by a de-legitinlization
formula. Furthermore, the Court would not have so openly appeared to uphold the au-
thority of Congress to overrule it on a question of the constitutional distribution of
power between the national government and the states in the regulation of commerce."
(p. 247). On the second he says: "In thus reaching its conclusion upon the basis of a
broad view of the police powers of the states the Court avoided placing itself in the
awkward position of acknowledging that Congress, by the Lacey Act, had permitted the
states to modify a federal statute . . .For the Court to take the position it did was
no doubt fortunate for the cause of wildlife conservation; but it achieved this proper
result through a ruling that represented a remarkable amendment of earlier judicial
statements on the power of states in their own right to interfere with the sale of goods
in the original package." (p. 123).
t Senior Attorney, Department of the Interior.
1418 [Vol. 51
REVIEWS
one of exhaustive search in public collections and private muniment rooms
for every available diary, of accurate transcription of the diaries, of thor-
ough cross-referencing and meticulous indexing, and of painstaking and de-
tailed indication of supplementary and complementary data already in print
or still in manuscript form on each point as it arises in the diaries. It is
this perfectionist editorial zeal which makes the Commons Debates in 1629
a joy for the working scholar. In the past twenty years, Notestein, his col-
laborators, and his students have published many thick volumes of Parlia-
mentary diaries all adhering to the same high standards, and more, we may
hope, are on the way.
The latest publication in the series, Willson Coates' edition of the Jour-
nal of Sir Simonds D'Eses for the period between October 12, 1641, and
January 10, 1642, is worthy of its pedigree. It is edited in the grand man-
ner. Coates' introduction with its explanation of editorial method, its analy-
sis of other available sources, and its biographical sketches of the diarists
whose work makes up the body of the book is also in the great tradition.
Mr. Coates has included, too, what has unfortunately been lacking in pre-
vious editorial work by Notestein and his associates, a brief appraisal of the
more significant historical developments in Parliament during the period cov-
ered in the book.
At first glance the last months of 1641 seem barren of measures having a
direct permanent effect on England's legal and constitutional structure. The
great days of constructive legislation had ended before Charles I left for
Scotland. The four months covered in the diaries edited by Coates are a
time of political disintegration, accelerated by the "Incident" in Scotland,
the revolt in Ireland, and the bitter struggle in Parliament itself over the po-
litical powers of the Episcopate. The breaking up of the unity of Parlia-
ment into Roundheads and Cavaliers, soon to be locked in Civil War, pro-
ceeds apace.
A closer examination of the diaries edited by Coates does not entirely con-
firm this first impression. It reveals, rather, a course of events in the
House of Commons that seems to proceed on three levels. First, imme-
diately visible on the surface, is the smooth functioning of the Parliamen-
tary machinery. Petitions, investigations, legislative drafting, committee
work, conferences, debate-all the necessary duties of a representative legis-
lature-are handled with certainty and precision. Notestein has traced the
origins of this legislative "know how" during the reigns of the early Stuarts
in his Winning of the Initiative by the House of Commons. In the first
months of the Long Parliament the new legislative machinery had turned out
that mass of permanent law which twenty years later was to serve as the
foundation of the Restoration settlement. But, by the end of 1641, a second
development had taken place. This machinery, formally unimpaired, has
ceased to turn out law, because it has been converted into a weapon which
factions struggle to control. It is this ever more intense battle of faction
that dominates the Long Parliament (and the diarists' narratives) in the last
months of 1641. In this connection the diaries serve to dispel an old illusion.
Because the members of the Commons soon had to take sides in the Civil
War-go with the King or stay at Westminster-scholars have assumed that
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Parliament had previously divided into two fairly distinct parties, Round-
heads and Cavaliers. The diaries up to the end of 1641 indicate the exist-
ence of at least four factions in Commons-the out and out King's men, the
Episcopal moderates led by Hyde, the Puritan reformers led by Pym, and
the Radicals. These factions'do not comprise the whole membership of Par-
liament. They are, rather, fairly close-knit clusters of members, each group
acting along preconcerted lines, seeking to rally to itself the unattached ma-
jority of the House. This pre-existence of groups in the Long Parliament
alone suffices to account for the early emergence of factions among both Cava-
liers and Roundheads after the outbreak of the Civil War.
In connection with the evolution of faction in the House of Commons a
third level of development appeared in the waning months of 1641, at once
the least conspicuous and one of the most durable of the legacies of the Long
Parliament. Under tremendous pressure the great politicians, Pym and Hyde,
worked out the technique of partisan manipulation of the representative body,
the technique that has been employed by legislative leaders ever since. They
worked under the cover of a comforting myth. With that preference for
fiction over fact which alone makes change possible in conservative bodies,
the House persistently denied the existence of faction in its midst. Yet a
careful reader of the diaries can hardly miss the wide variety of modern
party tactics that the leaders of the Parliamentary factions employed in the
last months of 1641: the trial balloon, the interment by committee, the cov-
ered retreat from a dangerous position, the filibuster, the careful timing of
motions and proposals (see Introduction p. xxvii f.). It is not by chance that
the relations of parties in free legislatures have always been described in
military terms-strategy, tactics, maneuver, force, combat, battle. Nor is it
mere metaphor. Party conflict in free legislatures is a real struggle for power
in which other weapons have been substituted for the instruments of physical
force. In 1641 we see those weapons being forged and wielded for the first
time in the way to which generations of Parliamentarian tradition have ac-
customed us. In the very last days covered by Coates' edition of the diaries,
an attempt at the exercise of naked force by the King, seeking to arrest five
members of the House of Commons, disrupts the wordy warfare of the fac-
tions. But the traditions and methods of Parliamentary maneuvering survive
the shock; they endure in the Long Parliament after the outbreak of Civil
War, in the Parliaments of the Protectorate; and they are resumed with
little delay in the Cavalier Parliament of the Restoration. From 1660 to the
present among English-speaking peoples, they have continued with little
change in a much changed world.
In his preface Professor Coates speaks of his edition of D'Ewes as "use-
less" research. In a sense he is right; it is likely to be useless because his-
,torians addicted to modern fashions in history are not likely to use it. They
will probably neglect it because old D'Ewes' patient note-taking, instead of
dealing with the impersonal "forces" and extra-human "factors" that are
the sustaining myths of present-day methodology, reflects with mirror accur-
acy the uhschematic push and pull of human wills that give the shape to his-
tory as it is lived. This sort of thing perplexes and annoys the historian who
sees only streams of tendency unbroken by the rough play of human hopes
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and fears, by erring men making mistakes, gauging things wrong, stumbling
about in the gloom of human ignorance, and thus making the queer decisions
that make history. He is so obsessed by the modern phobia, the dread of not
seeing the forest for the trees, that he ends up by seeing an ideal Platonic
forest in which there are no trees at all. D'Ewes, assisted by Professor Coates,
may serve to remind the modern historian that to understand what the forest
is one must know at least something about the trees.
J. H. HEXTER.
INTERNATIONAL LABOR CONVENTIONS: THEIR INTERPRETATION AND REvi-
SION. By Conley Hall Dillon. Chapel Hill: University of North Caru-
lina Press, 1942. Pp. xii, 272. $3.00.
HOWEVER presumptuous it may be for one who has never published a book
to criticize the work of a fellow-teacher written after many years of diligent
research, I cannot conceal my disappointment over the fact that, after having
collected his material so carefully, Professor Dillon has presented it so poorly.
The book often lacks both coherence and clarity. While events as late as
1940 are occasionally mentioned, much of it speaks as of 1933 (e.g., an un-
enlightening enumeration of the treatment of labor cases by German courts j
or some undefined intermediate date. In addition, the subject matter of the
book is not tied together; what is said about revision and what is said about
interpretation seem to straggle apart and are not linked together even by the
closing chapters. In the next to the last chapter. "Effect on Treaty Law and
Technique" (effect of what?, one may ask), the author, seemingly without
any clear purpose, rambles off into a discussion of the general procedure of
the International Labor Conference and then considers Conference recom-
mendations and their "ratification". The chapter entitled "Conclusion" is a
mere recapitulation that ends with the confused statement that "The value of
a workable method of revision administered by permanent agencies in a legal,
scientific manner possibly will cause the application of some of the newly
evolved principles in other fields of international action". Finally, because of
nonsequiturs, round-about language, and inaccurate terminology, many state-
ments are hard to grasp or misleading. A few typical examples will suffice.
"The procedure involved in the making of conventions demonstrates the com-
plexity of any attempt to conciliate the views of three groups of technical
subjects." (p. 15). "Amendment is provided fur in the League Covenant
when agreed to by the Council and by a majority of the Assembly." (p. 26).
"Technical considerations constitute an unusually large percentage of the
clauses necessitating modifications" [i.e., apparently, technical provisions often
need revision], (p. 31). "The very term revision involves the idea of effecting
a junction, so to speak, between the new provisions with which they are com-
bined." (p. 100).1 "In applying the provisions of bipartite instruments, it is
-Instructor in History, Queen's College.
1. Perhaps there is an inadvertent omission of a phrase here. The huul, is marred
by many such, even in quoted passages. Minor errors in quotation, particularly in for-
eign words, are rife.
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essential that the parties concerned have an understanding of the principles
involved and of the application of the provisions to be applied." (p. 127).
"This early expression of faith in recommendations as a means of advancing
national legislation may have been prompted by an overestimation of their
value, as there is no accurate means of measuring how they have been ap-
plied." (p. 202). "The formulation of conventions that are not binding until
they are ratified by two-thirds concurrence of the delegates present at the
Conference may weaken the unanimity rule to the extent that state sovereign-
ty may be less jealous of international authority." (p. 217).
It must be conceded that Chapter Six, "Interpretation by International
Bodies", is an admirable description of instances of interpretation of labor
treaties and refusal to interpi'et them by the Office (the Organization's staff
of employees headed by the Director), the Governing Body (the Organiza-
tion's executive committee), and the Permanent Court of International Jus-
tice. But even here the author's conclusions do not clarify; and in bad chap-
ters, like those on "Interpretation in National Courts" and "Legal Questions
in Revision", one feels he often does not himself fully understand the facts
and the arguments he is expounding for the reader.
If this review deals largely with the form of the book, it is because Pro-
fessor Dillon's contribution to learning is one of research and arrangement.
In brief, it sets forth: (1) that the International Labor Organization has
developed a procedure for revising its conventions that differs in detail from
the procedure followed in drafting conventions and that this revisory pro-
cedure may well serve as a pattern for others; (2) that the International
Labor Office usually, but not always, will, upon the request of governments,
interpret "unofficially" the text of its conventions; (3) that proposals for
interpretation by the Governing Body or by the Conference have always been
rejected, partly because the Permanent Court is designated by the Constitu-
tion as the interpreter both of the Constitution itself and of conventions
drafted under its terms; and (4) that the Permanent Court has given ad-
visory opinions of interpretation at four separate behests of the Council of the
League of Nations, while courts of member states have repeatedly applied
(and incidentally interpreted) such of the conventions as form part of the
national law administered by these several courts. These are matters of some
importance in the refounding of world order after the War. But Professor
Dillon shows them to us through so ill-ground a lens that the image is blurred.
One cannot take issue with the author's conclusions for they tend to such
futilities as, "This decision in favor of the claim under the convention indi-
cates that the circumstances of the case have much to do with the decision
and the rigidity of the law may be tempered to provide equity" (p. 181), or
"It would seem, from the cases examined, that the English courts are gener-
ally very liberal in their legislation under the convention and in the applica-
tion by the courts." (p. 184).
Future investigators will be indebted to Professor Dillon for his pioneer
work, with its good bibliography and index, but they will, I trust, expound
and comment with greater accuracy and penetration.
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